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Different design choices in the controls used to manage performance often lead to a range of 
unintended consequences, which have profound effects on individuals and organizations. 
This paper presents a mixed review (both systematic and eclectic) of the literature on the 
unintended consequences of performance management systems and develops a typology to 
explain how and why they occur. It finds that the most salient unintended consequences of 
directive performance management systems are gaming, information manipulation, selective 
attention, illusion of control and relationships transformation. It argues that these 
consequences exist due to limiting factors such as ignorance, error, short-term concerns, 
fundamental values, self-fulfilling forecasts and changes in social relationships. The 
emerging typology-based theory suggests that the choice of control mechanisms is based on 
two key assumptions concerning goal-alignment and goal uncertainty that relate back to ideas 
in agency theory and stewardship theory. It concludes that, in the design of performance 
management systems, the more the ‘assumed’ reality about the state of goal-alignment and 
goal-uncertainty diverges from the ‘real’ state of affairs, the more the resultant system is 
likely to create perverse unintended consequences, leading to poor organisational outcomes.  
 
Keywords: Performance management, organizational control, management control, 





Considerable research has been focused on explaining the extent to which performance 
management systems (PMSs), involving performance planning, measures, targets, incentives 
and other means of control, deliver their intended consequences (Franco-Santos et al., 2012; 
Melnyk et al., 2014; Smith and Bititci, 2017). For example, researchers have studied the 
effects PMSs have on phenomena such as strategic alignment (Ahn, 2001; Dossi and Patelli, 
2010; McAdam and Bailie, 2002), communication (Godener and Eric, 2004), corporate 
control (Cruz et al., 2011) or accounting performance (Crabtree and DeBusk, 2008; Davis 
and Albright, 2004; Ittner et al., 2003). These are some of the expected results most leaders 
have in mind when promoting performance management in their organizations (Ferreira and 
Otley, 2009). Less attention, however, has been given to the unintended consequences of 
PMSs (Franco-Santos et al., 2012). A few studies (Bevan and Hood, 2006; Smith, 1995a) 
have identified common negative side effects (e.g., measure fixation, myopia, gaming or 
manipulation of data). Yet, whilst we know the general existence of unexpected results, we 
still know little about how or why they occur. The aim of this paper is to address this gap in 
our knowledge.  
Research in this area is crucial as the unintended consequences of performance 
management may often have a perverse impact on organizations. For example, a public 
enquiry into the failings of a UK Hospital Trust (Francis, 2013) found that the overreliance of 
senior staff on the hospital’s PMS led to an organizational culture focused on doing the 
system’s “business” (e.g., hitting performance targets), resulting in patient neglect and high 
mortality rates. The enquiry emphasized that well-intended decisions associated with the 
process of managing performance produced consequences that were largely unintended 
(Francis, 2013). Paradoxically, a system aimed at facilitating the delivery of high-quality 
patient care and healthy lives, ended up creating the opposite results. Sadly, this event is not a 
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rare occurrence, and similar perverse outcomes generated by the use of performance 
management mechanisms can be found in the literature (Dahler-Larsen, 2014; Lindsay et al., 
2014; Parkinson, 2012).  
Sociologists have long fostered research on the unintended (Mica et al., 2011). They 
argue that unintended consequences are actually the norm rather than the exception; and that 
their existence requires theorising so these consequences can be curtailed (Elias, 1997; 
Merton, 1936). It follows from these ideas that, if PMSs invariably generate unintended 
consequences, it is vital for research in this area to go beyond their mere acknowledgement 
and description. To advance our knowledge, we need a theoretical understanding of the 
relationship between PMSs and their unintended consequences. This understanding will help 
us to better assess their effectiveness and minimise their dysfunctional side effects. With that 
in mind, the objective of this paper is to develop an organizational theory of the unintended 
consequences of PMSs. 
Theory development involves a number of tools and mental processes, some of which 
are difficult to describe and validate (Bourgeois, 1979; Cornelissen, 2017; Delbridge and 
Fiss, 2013; Doty and Glick, 1994; Shepherd and Suddaby, 2017; Snow and Ketchen David J., 
2014; Weick, 1989). Most scholars agree that a comprehensive review of relevant literature is 
at the core of any theory construction process (e.g., Bourgeois, 1979). An immersion in the 
literature can uncover tensions, paradoxes, and numerous puzzles that can lead to compelling 
explanations (Shepherd and Suddaby, 2017). Thus, following the advice of theory building 
scholars, our research thoroughly examines the literatures on both performance management 
and the sociology of the unintended with the purpose of uncovering and explaining, through a 
typology, the relationship between PMSs and their unintended consequences.  
Drawing on the insights extracted from the literature coupled with ideas from agency 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and stewardship theory (Davis et al., 
 
5 
1997a; Hernandez, 2012), we posit that the unintended undesirable consequences of PMSs 
are likely to occur when a system is designed using false assumptions about people’s 
behaviour and the incidence of uncertainty. False assumptions may be due to ignorance, 
error, immediate short-term concerns, fundamental values and ideologies, or self-fulfilling 
forecasts. Invalid assumptions will lead to the adoption of control mechanisms that do not fit 
the “real” context, altering the existing social relationships that shape individual decisions 
and actions and, over time, creating unintended effects with overall costs that may outweigh 
the benefits.  
Our work contributes to existing research in three important ways. Firstly, it provides 
some words of caution regarding the uncritical adoption of agency theory assumptions when 
designing PMSs.  Secondly, it contributes to previous performance management contingency 
research (Chenhall, 2003; Otley, 2016) providing additional evidence regarding the 
importance of “fit” between control mechanisms and their environment. Thirdly, the study 
enriches our understanding of the effectiveness of PMSs by illuminating the reasons why 
unintended consequences may occur, so they can be minimized although never fully 
eliminated.  
Literature review methodology 
We initially contemplated using a systematic review approach, consisting of a methodical, 
transparent and reproducible literature search and synthesis process with “the twin aims of 
enhancing the knowledge base and informing policy making and practice” (Tranfield et al., 
2003, p. 207). Systematic reviews have been praised for their usefulness in examining ‘what 
works’ (Gough, 2015), but their value for theory building has been highly criticised (Gough, 
2015; Gough et al., 2012). When the purpose of a review is not only to investigate ‘what 
works’, but also to uncover the logic or mechanisms that explain ‘why something works’ (or 
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does not work), systematic reviews may not be sufficient. For theory building some authors 
(e.g., Gough et al., 2012) suggest a systematic review can be complemented by a more 
eclectic review, allowing for a broader search for insights and “trial and error thinking and 
imagination” (Weick, 1989, p. 516). This alternative review method has been described as a 
“mixed method review” (Gough, 2015, p. 3) because it integrates some of the transparent and 
rigorous processes of systematic reviews (i.e., scoping study, selection of keywords and 
search streams, exclusion and inclusion criteria and quality assessment) whilst keeping the 
openness and scope of traditional reviews. Since our research has a theory building purpose, 
we adopted a mixed method review, consisting of both an eclectic literature review and a 
systematic review.  
Our eclectic review had three key objectives, central to any theorising attempt 
(Shepherd and Suddaby, 2017; Weick, 1989): to clarify the meanings of core terms; to 
discover existing shared research assumptions; and to identify existing theories that could 
help in our theorising work. To address these objectives, we analysed performance 
management research and the sociology literature on theorising the unintended (Waddington, 
2016). Our eclectic or traditional review process follows Ridley’s (2012) suggestions and is 
outlined in Table 1. The insights from this review helped us to ascertain the language, 
concepts, known relationships and previous considerations needed for our theory 
development endeavour (Weick, 1989). 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
Our systematic review focused on the unintended consequences of PMSs. We 
addressed two specific review questions: (1) what are the most common unintended 
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undesirable consequences of PMSs? And (2) what is known about how and why they occur? 
We followed the advice of Tranfield et al. (2003) and Briner and Denyer (2012), with a full 
description of the process being presented in Table 1. We initiated the review with a scoping 
study in which we examined classic works on the unintended consequences of performance 
management. This helped to identify key search words and segments of the literature where 
relevant knowledge was more likely to exist. We then investigated the research that had cited 
these classic papers and also performed additional searches in the EBSCO library database 
using search strings. We conducted our searches for the years 1950-2017 to give us good 
coverage and to include the years when the emerging work on the unintended consequences 
of performance management was published.  
When analysing the documents identified, we adopted a set of inclusion, exclusion 
and quality criteria. We included empirical and conceptual studies that provided insights 
about the dysfunctional unintended consequences of PMSs published in English. We 
excluded studies focused on the control of specific and narrow management processes or 
single functions (e.g., supply chains, production or marketing). We also excluded 
commentaries on books, erratum papers, introductory papers to special issues, and conference 
summaries. To ensure the quality of the work, we focused on studies considered 3* and 4* by 
the ABS Academic Journal Guide (see journal list in Table 1). To analyse the contend of each 
selected article, we first extracted critical information about the field of research, research 
method, context, control mechanisms studied, unintended consequences found, and 
explanations provided. We then adopted a thematic analysis and provided a narrative 




Findings: Eclectic review 
We first synthesise the findings of our traditional review. These findings are presented in two 
separate sections: one dedicated to the insights unearthed from the general performance 
management literature; and another dedicated to the insights of the sociology literature on 
theorising unintended consequences.  
Performance management research 
When reviewing performance management research, we paid special attention to three areas 
considered to be critical for our subsequent theorising attempt: the meaning of PMSs, shared 
research assumptions, and the organizational theories that can help explain PMS 
consequences.  
Definition of a performance management system  
In any theorising endeavour, it is critical to clarify the meaning of core terms (Shepherd and 
Suddaby, 2017). In the literature, a PMS has been broadly defined as a set of management 
control mechanisms used by executives and employees with the overall purpose of 
facilitating the delivery of organizational goals by influencing people’s behaviour and 
performance (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009; Ferreira and Otley, 2009; Malmi and Brown, 
2008). At the very least, a PMS comprises: a planning element, which includes the goals that 
reflect stakeholders’ expectations and thus defines performance; a measurement element, 
which includes the metrics used to operationalize performance; a review element, which 
refers to the evaluation and feedback of performance information; and a performance-related 
reward element, which can be extrinsic (e.g., bonuses) or intrinsic (e.g., a clear sense of 
achievement) (Ferreira and Otley, 2009; Flamholtz et al., 1985; Otley, 1999). A PMS can 
also include further control elements, such as cultural and administrative controls (Malmi and 
Brown, 2008; Ouchi, 1979). 
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It should be noted that the term ‘PMS’2 is of relatively recent origin and has emerged from a 
previous stream of literature that discussed what is known as ‘management control systems’ 
(Ferreira and Otley, 2009; Otley, 1999). We view these two terms as largely synonymous 
whilst noting that earlier work tended to focus on systems of financial and budgetary controls 
rather than on a wider range of organizational control mechanisms. This reflects the fact that 
formal control systems were rudimentary and relied primarily on financial data until the later 
1980s. In this paper, we use the term ‘PMS’. We view it as an overall system combining a 
variety of specific mechanisms that will vary from organization to organization. 
Shared research assumptions 
Theory building emerges from the identification and questioning of existing shared 
assumptions (Shepherd and Suddaby, 2017; Weick, 1989). The following assumptions of 
PMS research are particularly relevant as they provide a foundation on which to base our 
theoretical work.  
Firstly, previous research largely regards each of the control mechanisms comprised 
in a PMS as a subsystem in its own right (e.g. measurement system, reward system)(Ferreira 
and Otley, 2009; Malmi and Brown, 2008; Otley, 1999). These sub-systems may have been 
designed by different people (e.g., HR managers, strategy managers, management 
accountants) and at different points in time. They may work differently within each of the 
organizational functions (and possibly locations), and at different hierarchical levels (Ferreira 
and Otley, 2009). It is often assumed that the overriding purpose of these separate subsystems 
                                                 
2 The literature in Human Resource Management often uses this term in the restricted sense of (annual) 
employee performance appraisal of a primarily developmental nature. 
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is to act as a coordinated system to help the organization attain its goals, although such a 
complete integration is rarely achieved in practice (see Otley, 2016).  
Secondly, the control mechanisms forming a PMS are considered to be connected to 
each other in a variety of ways (Ferreira and Otley, 2009; Malmi and Brown, 2008). Using 
the concepts of “tightly” and “loosely coupled” systems (Weick, 1976, p. 4), it can be 
suggested that some controls are tightly coupled (i.e., they are not only linked together in 
some ways, but they are also highly dependent on each other so that changes in one control 
lead to consequent changes in others) (Franco-Santos et al., 2014; Malmi and Brown, 2008; 
Otley, 2016). Other control mechanisms may be loosely coupled (i.e., they are subsystems 
that operate on an exchange relationship where little input is needed from each additional 
subsystem – that is, subsystems may interact but they are not dependent on each other to 
function adequately) (Franco-Santos et al., 2014; Malmi and Brown, 2008; Otley, 2016). 
Thirdly, PMSs are constantly evolving (Cardinal et al., 2004; Ferreira and Otley, 
2009). Control mechanisms that are seen to have deficiencies are improved or transformed 
(Chenhall and Euske, 2007). Changes are made on an on-going basis, often with the aim of 
aligning disparate subsystems with each other, or responding to new internal and external 
pressures (Chenhall, 2003; Otley, 2016). However, significant lags in alignment (or degrees 
of integration) may occur3; new control mechanisms may also be introduced that have their 
own differences from the extant controls; and the speed of integration often lags the rate of 
introduction of new elements (Otley, 2016).  
Fourthly, the control mechanisms that comprise a PMS can be either formal or 
informal (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009; Ferreira and Otley, 2009; Malmi and Brown, 2008). 
                                                 
3 Pay for performance systems are particularly ‘sticky' in this respect as they often require renegotiation with 
groups of employees and the measures used to drive performance-related pay are invariably slow to get updated. 
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Formal control mechanisms (e.g., measures, targets, etc.) are considered tangible objects that 
can be controlled and easily changed. Informal control mechanisms (e.g., peer pressure, 
routines) are less tangible social phenomena that are more difficult to investigate and change 
(Chenhall and Morris, 1995; Kreutzer et al., 2016). In the literature, there appears to be a 
general understanding that formal control mechanisms are likely to have dysfunctional effects 
and these can be mitigated by the use of informal means of control (Kreutzer et al., 2016; 
Malmi and Brown, 2008). Despite this general understanding of the likely existence of 
unintended consequences, as suggested earlier, little appears to be known about how or why 
these consequences emerge.  
Finally, PMSs are based on implicit or explicit mental models that predict likely 
outcomes (Otley and Berry, 1980). Individual managers each have their own mental models 
by which they decide upon particular courses of action because they predict these will lead to 
specific desirable outcomes. Different managers may often have markedly different 
predictive models, which may lead to different uses of control mechanisms (Hall, 2011). 
When organizations design central PMSs, their designers have cognitive schemas in their 
minds that reflect their own interpretation of organizational goals, together with their view of 
the drivers of organizational success and how these drivers relate to each other (Otley and 
Berry, 1980). Designers’ models are often based on an array of assumptions about people, the 
environmental conditions under which the organization operates, and about the control 
mechanisms that best suit these drivers of organizational success (Broadbent and Laughlin, 
2009).  
Seminal theories on the consequences of performance management systems 
For the development of new theory, it is important to review extant theories illuminating the 
phenomenon under study (Shepherd and Suddaby, 2017; Weick, 1989). When reviewing 
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theories, we focused on those that provided general statements explaining PMSs existence 
and predicting their consequences. As such, three well-known organizational theories were 
identified: contingency theory of accounting (Otley, 1980, 2016), agency theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997b; Hernandez, 
2012).  
The contingency theory  of management accounting (Otley, 1980, 2016)  argues that a 
‘universal approach’ to the design and use of PMSs across and within organizations is 
unlikely to be effective. Control mechanisms are to be tailored to fit the specific 
circumstances of their use and context to deliver their intended consequences. Since the 
1980s, an array of factors (or contingencies) has been shown to influence the design, use and 
consequences of control mechanisms (e.g. environmental uncertainty, task complexity) 
(Chenhall, 2003; Otley, 1980). Recent contingency research suggests that the number of 
factors influencing PMSs has expanded together with the complexity of these systems (Otley, 
2016). As a result, the provision of precise prescriptions taking into consideration the 
increasing number of contingencies affecting PMSs is unlikely to be possible.  
Most previous PMS research is underpinned by agency theory (Franco-Santos et al., 
2012; Otley, 1999; Otley and Berry, 1980). Agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) explains the choice, use and consequences of organizational control 
mechanisms. According to the basic model of this theory4, organizations seek to fulfil the 
goal expectations of their owners and employees are assumed to be self-serving or 
opportunistic, effort-averse, and risk-averse. This situation generates a goal-alignment 
                                                 
4 We acknowledge that there are different strands of agency theory and that over the years it has been extended 
to accommodate numerous developments. However, we noticed in the review of the literature that most 
performance management research interprets agency theory in terms of its basic model (Eisenhardt, 1989). This 
version of the theory is also the most commonly recognised by managers and by management scholars.  
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problem and increases the uncertainty of outcomes as employees may “shirk” by putting in 
less effort, or by focusing on their own goals at the expense of owners’ goals (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Nilakant and Rao, 1994).  
To address these issues, agency theory (Baiman, 1982; Eisenhardt, 1989), drawing 
mainly on the discipline of economics, suggests the use of two tightly coupled control 
mechanisms: monitoring systems including explicit goals, performance measures and targets 
that provide information and help to assess employee behaviour and the results of their 
actions; and incentive systems such as short-term bonuses or stock options to encourage 
employees to focus on the realization of the organization’s goals. Previous research has 
referred to these control mechanisms as directive (Franco-Santos and Doherty, 2017, p. 
2319).  
Stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997b; Hernandez, 2012) is another theory 
explaining the choice, use and consequences of control mechanisms; although it is often 
positioned as contrary to agency theory. It has its roots in psychology and sociology and 
suggests that the assumptions of agency theory are too restrictive to apply to many 
organizations and employees, so exclusive reliance on its ideas and proposed controls may 
lead to undesirable consequences (Davis et al., 1997b). Stewardship theory assumes 
organizations have multiple and complex goals, and employees can behave as stewards rather 
than agents, having “a shared sense of ongoing responsibility to multiple stakeholders, which 
affects a focus on collective welfare over the long term” (Hernandez, 2012, p. 176).  
Stewardship theorists (Davis et al., 1997b; Hernandez, 2012) argue that goal-
alignment is not an issue stewardship type organizations need to resolve. Uncertainty is seen 
as the natural state of affairs, so organizations must learn how to respond and cope with it. 
Consequently, if there is no goal-misalignment and uncertainty cannot be ‘managed’, the 
adoption of monitoring and incentive controls is unnecessary; it may actually be 
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dysfunctional undermining the positive attitudes of stewards (Hernandez, 2012). Rather than 
relying on agency type controls, stewardship theorists suggest that organizations may be 
better off by “fostering relationship-centred collaboration through shared leadership practices, 
promoting employees’ collective responsibility for work outcomes, enabling employees to 
derive intrinsic benefits from working towards a valued end; and cultivating self-efficacy and 
self-determination through ongoing employee development” (Hernandez, 2012, p. 177). Due 
to the focus on facilitating performance rather than controlling it, this type of control has been 
labelled as enabling (Franco-Santos and Doherty, 2017). 
The different control approaches suggested by agency and stewardship theories 
resonate with a series of apparent conceptual dichotomies that have been frequently 
mentioned in different management literatures although rarely considered in combination. 
For example, concepts such as ‘technical’ and ‘social controls’ (as in socio-technical 
systems) (Smith and Bititci, 2017) focus on different aspects of the design and use of PMSs, 
but suggest that both views need to be combined. ‘Transactional’ and ‘relational’ controls 
have been distinguished (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009), with the first approach based on the 
assumption that business is conducted as a series of unrelated arm’s length transactions, 
whereas the second recognizes the importance of continued relationships over time. 
‘Coercive’ and ‘enabling’ (Adler and Borys, 1996) have also been used in previous works to 
refer to two different approaches of organising work in bureaucracies. Finally, the well-
known ‘Theory X’ and ‘Theory Y’ (McGregor, 1960) has been highly influential, with 
Theory X assuming that people must be coerced into behaving appropriately in an 
organizational context, and Theory Y assuming that people will naturally behave in a 
cooperative manner if treated appropriately. We do not see each of these pairs of contrasts as 
identical but regard them as displaying a significant degree of commonality that allows us to 
use the distinction between them as an underlying construct of considerable importance. 
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Building on recent research (Franco-Santos et al., 2017) and for the sake of clarity, we will 
use the terms ‘directive’ and ‘enabling’ systems to describe this contrast whilst recognizing 
the much wider literature that is embodied in this overall idea. 
Having synthesised the insights extracted from the performance management 
literature we now turn to examine the ideas acquired from the sociology literature on 
theorising unintended consequences.  
Unintended consequences research 
To better understand how and why the unintended consequences of performance management 
may be dysfunctional, we reviewed previous research focused on theorising unintended 
consequences. The management literature is largely silent on this topic (Franco-Santos et al., 
2012) with most relevant research coming from sociology (Waddington, 2016). Sociology 
has been described as the social science most active in examining the “unrecognised, 
unintended and emergent consequences of goal-oriented action” or “the science of the 
unexpected” (Portes, 2000, p. 1). We narrowed our focus to the most well-known 
sociological work investigating core meanings, shared assumptions and theories of 
unintended consequences.  
Definition of unintended consequences 
An unintended consequence has been defined as “a particular effect of purposive action 
which is different from what was wanted the moment of carrying out the act, and the want of 
which was a reason for carrying it out” (Baert, 1991, p. 201). In other words, it is the 
outcome of a conscious action other than that foreseen and intended. The term ‘purposive 
action’ was initially used by politicians and economists (e.g., Smith, 1759), but it was the 
sociologist Robert Merton (1936) who popularised it and the concept is now widely use in 




Research focused on theorising unintended consequences often shares the following 
assumptions (Baert, 1991; Mica et al., 2011). Firstly, it assumes there is a recognised 
intention on the part of the person or actor carrying out an action. This intention is to improve 
the state of things. Secondly, it accepts that any action will unavoidably have unintended 
consequences. Some of these unintended consequences may be desirable or beneficial, whilst 
others may be undesirable or dysfunctional with the possibility of reaching a point where they 
become perverse (i.e., the opposite of the intended). Thirdly, it suggests that unintended 
undesirable consequences can be minimized, but never fully eliminated. Fourthly, it supposes 
that it is vital to theorise unintended undesirable consequences to avoid an overall result in 
which an action, policy or practice ‘backfires’ (i.e., does more harm than good). Most 
sociology research, therefore, focuses on the explanation of undesirable unintended 
consequences and the situations under which these consequences may frustrate the 
underlying intention of the actors (Baert, 1991). It is worth noting that most researchers 
equate unintended consequences with unanticipated, unforeseen or unexpected effects (Baert, 
1991, p. 201). 
Existing theories of unintended consequences 
Most research explaining unintended consequences (Mackay and Chia, 2013; Mckinley and 
Scherer, 2000; Peattie et al., 2016; Perri, 2014) refers to the ideas introduced by Merton 
(1936, 1968, 1996), and later extended by Elias (1998). Both authors provide the bedrock for 
the theoretical developments of the unintended consequences of purposive action (de Zwart, 
2015; Mica et al., 2011). Merton (1936, p. 894) contends that any “purposive social action” 
inevitably has unintended consequences. Thus, some unintended consequences may actually 
be expected or anticipated as they may have been taken into consideration when deciding on 
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the action. This point is critical for PMS research and, as suggested by Baert (1991), most 
social research underplays it or completely ignores it.  
Merton (1936) is the first scholar to provide a general theory of unintended 
consequences. His work is widely recognised as the point of departure for any theory of 
unintended consequences (de Zwart, 2015; Mica et al., 2011). He argues that unintended 
consequences result from the interplay between actions and the situation in which actions 
occur, which is an explanation that resonates with the idea of ‘contingency fit’ in 
management research (Donaldson, 2001; Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Otley, 2016). He 
further elaborates his theory suggesting that unintended consequences exist because actors 
cannot anticipate all that can happen as a result of their chosen actions. Merton identifies five 
factors that may limit actors’ possibilities to anticipate the full consequences of their actions: 
(1) actors may not have sufficient knowledge or they may ignore the knowledge they have; 
(2) they may err in the appraisal of the present and future situation, in the selection of a 
course of action or in the execution of the action chosen; (3) they may have an acute concern 
with the foreseen immediate or short-term consequences and give little consideration to 
longer-term outcomes, which Merton (1936) labels as the ‘imperious immediacy of interest’; 
(4) actors may have fundamental values, which justify the felt necessity of certain actions; 
and (5) actors may take into consideration a preconceived idea suggesting particular 
outcomes and this prediction in itself becomes a new element in the concrete situation which 
subsequently makes the prediction accurate (‘a self-fulfilling prophecy’). Merton suggests 
that these factors are not mutually exclusive and may reinforce each other. 
The extension that Elias (1997, 1998) applies to Merton’s (1936, 1968, 1996) work is 
crucial as he provides a clearer explanation of the way in which purposive social action 
creates unintended undesirable consequences (Mica et al., 2011). Elias argues that unintended 
consequences mainly occur due to the social relationships existing in any group of people. 
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People’s knowledge of the social relationships in which they operate is unavoidably 
imperfect, incomplete and inaccurate. Therefore, their actions, which are based on their 
inadequate knowledge, more often than not, will have consequences they do not foresee 
(Mennell, 1977). Elias argues that the consequences of intended actions can only be 
understood by investigating the dynamics of social relationships. Equally, people's behaviour 
can only be understood in relation to the social relationships in which they operate. Intended 
actions bring about changes to social relationships, and social relationships in turn influence 
people's behaviour not always in the way intended. In short, Elias contends that unintended 
consequences of intended actions will always occur and that these consequences, together 
with the intended ones, create the basis for future action.  
Bringing Merton’s and Elias’ ideas closer to our research, it can be argued that the 
development and use of PMSs involves purposive social actions and that these actions will 
have both intended and unintended consequences. As researchers, we need to strive to 
explain the occurrence of these consequences; and, in particular, the occurrence of 
undesirable or dysfunctional consequences, so we can minimize abnormalities. The use of 
Merton's limiting factors leading to unintended consequences together with Elias’ focus on 
the importance of social relationships dynamics are instrumental for the purpose of our 
theory. However, as they recommend, further insights about the specific unintended 
consequences of particular purposive actions are needed in any theorising attempt supporting 
the need for a systematic review of the unintended consequences of PMSs. The next section 
describes the key findings from our systematic review. 
Findings: Systematic review 
Our systematic review had two key objectives. Firstly, to identify the most common 
unintended consequences of PMSs, and secondly, to analyse what is known about how and 
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why they occur as reported in the performance management literature. Performance 
management research has identified a number of unintended undesirable consequences over 
the years (see Table 2). A priori, it is interesting to note that this literature interprets the 
concept of ‘unintended consequences’ as the negative unexpected effects of PMSs, which 
implies that the analysis of unintended beneficial consequences as such has been largely 
overlooked. The literature also seems to focus (not always explicitly) on the ‘directive’ 
control mechanisms endorsed by agency theorists (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976); and it is mainly published in management accounting, general management, and 
public-sector management journals. Most studies concentrate on how the use of performance 
measures and targets linked to monetary incentives (i.e., directive or agency theory-related 
systems) may have unexpected negative outcomes, especially in complex environments. 
Little has been said about unintended consequences emanating from ‘enabling’ or 
stewardship theory-related controls (e.g., peer pressure, cultural controls).  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
The unintended consequences of performance management systems 
From our literature analysis and thematic coding five salient dysfunctional unintended 
consequences of PMSs emerged. Firstly, directive PMSs have been shown to produce 
strategic behaviour or gaming as individuals alter the way in which they behave to fulfil 
performance expectations, sometimes to the point of breaching ethical norms (Berliner, 1956; 
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Hood, 2006; Jensen, 2003). In total 815 percent of the literature selected identified gaming as 
a major unintended consequence. Interestingly, not all studies presented gaming as perverse. 
A reduced set (e.g., Berliner, 1956) treated it as a ‘necessary evil’ worth having for the effort 
gains obtained from PMSs.  
Secondly, directive PMSs appear to be associated with various forms of information 
manipulation (Cardinaels and Yin, 2015; Hood, 2006; Jensen, 2003; Kalgin, 2016; Smith, 
1995a). Performance information is often misrepresented, misinterpreted, reclassified or 
made up in order to meet performance requirements. 74 percent of the literature reviewed 
mentioned this unexpected consequence. The deliberate manipulation of data can range from 
creative accounting to clear fraud. Concepts such as ‘fiddling’ (Mannion and Braithwaite, 
2012), ‘managing the numbers’ (Jensen, 2003; Li, 2015) or plain ‘dishonesty’ (Hannan et al., 
2006) are common in this body of work.  
Thirdly, directive PMSs are likely to generate selective attention with 55 percent of 
our selected articles referring to this phenomenon. Selective attention occurs both in terms of 
‘what’ is measured and in terms of ‘when’ is measured. Managers appear to become fixated 
on performance measures and targets that are quantified or formally considered in PMSs, 
causing those aspects of organizational goals that are not (or cannot be) measured to be 
overlooked (Hood, 2006; Kerpershoek et al., 2016; Mannion and Braithwaite, 2012; Smith, 
1995a). They also tend to focus on actions that focus on short-term goals (or what in the 
literature is described as ‘short-termism’ or ‘myopia’ (Merchant, 1990)), rather than selecting 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that this percentage reflects the degree of attention that each consequence has received in the 
literature. It does not necessarily reflect the importance of each consequence or its relevance in the process for 
creating perverse outcomes for the organization. 
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actions which may have greater long-term benefits but smaller (or even negative) impacts in 
the short-term.  
Fourthly, directive systems often produce an illusion of control. Over time, the use of 
these controls leads managers to believe their assumptions about performance, its 
measurement, and accountability are applicable to their organization. These premises give 
way to the idea that PMSs accurately and validly reflect ‘actual’ performance (Chwastiak, 
2006; Cugueró-Escofet and Rosanas, 2017; Hood, 2006). This unintended consequence is 
cited by 24 percent of the studies included in the review. The illusion of control is often 
perverse, especially, in highly uncertain and complex environments. 
Finally, 81 percent of our selected studies suggest that both directive and enabling 
PMSs are likely to alter the social relationships operating in organizations. For instance, 
Chwastiak (2006) and Conrad and Guven (2012) found the PMSs studied, which were 
focused on monitoring through performance measures, targets and incentives (i.e. agency 
theory related), promoted transactional relationships, diminishing trust as well as generating 
inequalities and differentiation. By contrast, Segal and Lehrer (2012) show how the transition 
from an agency-related performance management approach to a stewardship-related approach 
in a Canadian school district led to a transformation in the social relationships experienced by 
staff from mistrust and alienation to high trust and benevolence, decreasing corruption and 
other unintended effects. 
Other unintended consequences of directive PMSs less prominent in the literature are: 
administrative overload and managerial time costs due to the design, implementation and use 
requirements of the system (e.g., Cox, 2005; Hansen et al., 2003); de-professionalization or 
movement away from professional values and standards (Agyemang and Broadbent, 2015; 
Tan and Rae, 2009); decreased well-being and morale (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002; Franco-
Santos et al., 2017); ‘ossification’ (i.e., tendency towards being in a rigid state, constraining 
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responsiveness and resisting change) (Mannion and Braithwaite, 2012; Smith, 1995b); stifled 
innovation (Lindsay et al., 2014); and injustice, unfairness and inequalities (Cugueró-Escofet 
and Rosanas, 2016). 
In comparison with the amount of work conducted in the for-profit sector on the 
intended consequences of PMSs (Franco-Santos et al., 2012), it is noticeable that a large 
proportion of the research on unintended dysfunctional consequences has taken place in 
public sector organizations. In these organizations, the unintended consequences of PMS 
mechanisms were deemed to be perverse (rather than necessary evils), not just for the users of 
the system, but also for other stakeholders (e.g. public, patients, students, society in general) 
(e.g., Conrad and Guven Uslu, 2012). In for-profit organizations, the predominant 
undesirable unintended consequences studied were related to information manipulation, 
strategic behaviour and short-termism (Healy, 1985; Jensen, 2003; Lowe and Shaw, 1968). 
Explanations of how and why unintended consequences occur 
Most extant research describes undesirable unintended consequences of performance 
management, but very few scholars provide in-depth explanations about how and why these 
consequences emerge in the first place. Nevertheless, after carefully reading and interpreting 
the literature selected, the following insights can be extracted. Most scholars relate the 
occurrence of unintended consequences to an increase in managers’ perceived pressure (Li, 
2015; Merchant, 1990); the particular design or use of the PMS (Hopwood, 1972; Mannion 
and Braithwaite, 2012; Schwepker and Good, 2012); and environmental complexity (Conrad 
and Guven Uslu, 2012; Cox, 2005; Tan and Rae, 2009). Each of these reasons is examined in 
turn. 
There is some consensus on the idea that managers perceived high performance 
pressure when directive PMSs are in operation (Merchant, 1990). Managers may interpret the 
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presence of high pressure as a threat (more so when there are known penalties for not 
reaching targets such as lower pay or reduced opportunities for promotion). If they feel there 
are possibilities for non-compliance, they may choose to do things that in other circumstances 
they would not do (e.g., gaming, lying) (Carmichael, 1970). Over time, these behaviours may 
be internalised and rationalised, affecting trust and social interactions (Cardinaels and Yin, 
2015). In some contexts, gaming and low-trust environments are considered a ‘price worth 
paying’ (Berliner, 1956) or ‘part of business life’ (Jensen, 2003). In others, high-trust social 
relationships are paramount (e.g., hospitals, schools, universities) and, when these relations 
are changed, perverse effects may appear (McCann et al., 2015).  
Many scholars argue that unintended consequences are due to issues associated with 
the particular design or use of PMSs (Berliner, 1956; Chow et al., 1988; Hopwood, 1972; 
Kalgin, 2016). For instance, the link between performance measurement and rewards is found 
to be a critical choice that can lead to negative unintended consequences (Berliner, 1956; 
Jensen, 2003; Kerpershoek et al., 2016). Scholars have noticed that people’s sense of gain (or 
loss) associated with performance-related rewards can lead to strategic behaviour, affecting 
coordination, collaboration and social dynamics (Lowe and Shaw, 1968). It can generate 
feelings of unfairness and injustice pushing people in the wrong direction (Cugueró-Escofet 
and Rosanas, 2017). Hopwood (1972) highlights that including performance information in 
the performance management process does not necessarily lead to dysfunctionalities, rather 
arguing that these are caused by the way in which such data is used. He finds that using data 
in ways that enable learning rather than with the sole purpose of controlling individuals leads 
to less data manipulation.  
A few researchers suggest that unintended consequences are due to complexity and 
uncertainty issues. For example, Merchant (1990) argues that managers operating in 
uncertain environments were significantly more likely to react to budget pressure by gaming 
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the system. Berliner (1956) observes that the continuous change in leaders created increased 
uncertainty and more opportunities for gaming. The work of Tan and Rae (2009) also 
suggests that in highly complex and regulated organizations such as airports, hospitals or 
education institutions the use of directive PMSs is more likely to create side effects. They 
argue this is due to aspects such as measurement difficulties (i.e., not everything that matters 
can be measured, and existing measures might be ‘noisy’ or distorted), diverse stakeholders’ 
needs which cannot always be reconciled, or conflicting targets.  
Together with these common explanations, a few researchers assert the unintended 
consequences of a direct PMS are associated with its underlying assumptions about people’s 
behaviour (Cardinaels and Yin, 2015; Franco-Santos et al., 2017; Kerpershoek et al., 2016; 
Lindsay et al., 2014). Rooted in agency theory, directive mechanisms are tools to help 
managers (i.e., principals) control the performance of employees (i.e., agents), who are 
assumed to be opportunistic (Kerpershoek et al., 2016). By choosing directive controls (i.e., 
measures, targets, individual reviews, incentive pay), managers are indirectly sending a 
message to employees about the needs for control implying that employees cannot be trusted. 
At the individual level, this choice of controls may indicate to employees that others are 
behaving opportunistically, which in turn may influence their own behaviour. As suggested 
by Cardinaels (2015), the belief that employees in general are opportunistic (i.e., agents) will 
change social norms and, over time, people will conform or internalised these norms 
increasing their self-interested behaviour. In ‘mission-oriented’ organizations (e.g., hospitals, 
schools, universities), where professionals and professional values often dominate (i.e., 
people more likely to behave as stewards rather than agents), false theories about people’s 
behaviour, the importance of relationships and the real complexity of the context, can be the 
grounds for the unintended consequences of direct controls to become perverse (Chwastiak, 
2006; Franco-Santos et al., 2017; Kerpershoek et al., 2016; McCann et al., 2015). 
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Notwithstanding these varied rationalisations, researchers appear to have shied away 
from providing specific predictions (i.e., a theory) relating not just directive PMSs to 
unintended consequences, but also enabling PMSs to their own unintended consequences. 
The absence of theorising, may be partly due to the multidimensional and complex nature of 
explanatory factors and their potential relationships. Based on the insights extracted from 
both of our reviews (see Table 3 for a summary), we now attempt to provide such a theory.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
Towards a new theory of the unintended  
Before explaining our suggested theoretical framework, we find it necessary to clarify our 
style of theorising. We believe this clarification will help to improve the transparency of our 
theorising process and, hopefully, avoid misunderstandings. 
Style of theorising 
As suggested by Cornelissen (2017, p. 2), “at its core, a style [of theorising] is a particular 
form of argumentation that we use to structure our thinking and express our ideas about a 
management or organizational phenomenon in a common idiom”. Such an idiom can take the 
form of propositions, a narrative of a series of interconnected processes or a typology 
(Cornelissen, 2017; Delbridge and Fiss, 2013; Shepherd and Suddaby, 2017). All three styles 
of theorising have their benefits and limitations (Cornelissen, 2017). We have chosen to 
derive our theory of the unintended consequences of PMSs following a typology style 
because of the complexity and multidimensional nature of the mechanisms at play which 
made the other two theorising options less suitable (Cornelissen, 2017). 
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A typology style of theorising proceeds by “categorizing and clustering ideas and 
observations to offer a multidimensional take on a management or organizational subject” 
(Cornelissen, 2017, p. 6). Typologies are “conceptually derived, interrelated sets of ideal 
types. […] [Each ideal type] represents a unique combination of the organizational attributes 
that are believed to determine the relevant outcome(s)” (Doty and Glick, 1994, p. 232). A 
typology style allows us to move beyond traditional linear or interaction theories and to 
incorporate the multiple contingencies that are likely to relate to the unintended consequences 
of PMSs. This type of theorising assumes that the “way organizational factors fit together is 
very important and that to understand organizations we must consider simultaneously 
multiple characteristics” (Doty and Glick, 1994). Another important aspect of typological 
theories is that they incorporate the idea of ‘equifinality’ (i.e., different ideal types can reach 
the same outcome following different paths)(Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985).  
Good typologies provide explanations at two different levels: At one level, they 
provide a grand theory generalizable to all organizations; at another level, they include a set 
of middle-range theories restricted to the individual ideal types (Doty and Glick, 1994). In 
many cases, grand theories are implicit and state that particular configurations grouped into 
ideal types maximise ‘fit’ and can explain the outcome(s) (e.g., Miles and Snow, 1978). 
Middle-range theories have narrower boundaries and explain the internal consistency of the 
underlying mechanisms operating within each ideal type (Doty and Glick, 1994). These 
theories may be based on different assumptions and the pattern of relationships that explain a 
particular ideal type does not necessarily need to generalize to all the ideal types or to all 
organizations (Doty and Glick, 1994).  
As described earlier, the process of theory development can be initiated with a 
thorough review of the literature, but it needs to be accompanied by other less observable 
cognitive processes occurring simultaneously as the theorist interprets the evidence and 
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makes sense of it, creating connections and making generalisations (Shepherd and Suddaby, 
2017; Weick, 1989). We present the results of our theory development process next.  
Theorising the unintended consequences of performance management  
In this section we make explicit our grand theoretical assertion, we define the key dimensions 
that form the basis of our typology, and we examine the middle-range theories that predict 
each ideal type. 
Grand theoretical assertion: The importance of fit 
As shown in our review, the contingency theory of management accounting (Chenhall, 2003; 
Otley, 1980, 2016) is an overarching theory underpinning most research in PMSs. This theory 
is based on the premise that the control mechanisms co-existing to form a PMS need to be 
tailored to fit the specific circumstances of the organization. The better the ‘fit’ between a 
PMS and its contingencies, the greater its effectiveness will be (i.e., the degree to which its 
intended results are achieved) (Otley, 1980, 2016). Building on these ideas, our grand 
theoretical assertion is that an identified set of ideal PMSs types will maximize the fit 
between the chosen control mechanisms and the existing organizational conditions  
Knowing that a better fit will drive better results does not mean that, in practice, 
organizations will design the systems that are meant to be best for their circumstances. 
Managers may (inevitably) have imperfect knowledge of the organization, its context and its 
people; they may make mistakes when analysing the organization or when choosing the 
control mechanisms that best fit organizational conditions; they may have immediate or 
short-term pressures, discounting the importance of long-term effects; they may be biased by 
particular values or ideologies; or their own believes may lead to self-fulfilling prophecies 
(Merton, 1936). Because of these limiting factors, managers will make specific choices 
between alternatives resulting in PMSs that may be (to various degrees) not fully aligned with 
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the situations they are meant to deal with. Thus, managers cannot anticipate all that can 
happen to avoid potential issues and, inevitably, unintended consequences will appear. 
Following Merton’s (1936) logic, some of these unintended consequences can be predicted 
and curtailed through careful theorising about the “purposive action” and the situation or 
context in which the action takes place. Therefore, if we assume a PMS to be a “purposive 
action” (i.e., a deliberate act intended to cause change, which in this case is to improve 
performance): how can we predict the unintended consequences of a PMS, especially those 
that can lead to dysfunctionalities making it a perverse system?  
To address this question, we go back to the idea that there is variability in the type of 
control mechanisms organizations design and use (Bedford et al., 2016; Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2009; Ferreira and Otley, 2009; Malmi and Brown, 2008). Some organizations 
heavily rely on performance monitoring and extrinsic rewards whilst others rely on other 
more enabling means to deliver their mission and performance (Franco-Santos et al., 2014; 
Frey et al., 2013). We suggest that organisations relying on directive PMSs in highly 
uncertain contexts are likely to experience more undesirable unintended consequences not 
just for managers but also for other stakeholders (Mannion and Braithwaite, 2012; Smith, 
1995a). The findings of our reviews can help us explain this phenomenon.  
Key dimensions: goal-alignment and goal-uncertainty 
Our conjecture is that when organizations develop their PMSs, managers base their decisions 
about which control mechanisms to introduce on two key factors. As suggested by agency 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), they make assumptions about the 
existing level of goal-alignment (i.e., how aligned they believe the goals or interests of 
employees are to the goals of the organization). Whilst it is recognized that goal-alignment 
can never be perfect (for example, the trade-offs between conflicting goals need to be 
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continually re-evaluated and communicated6), it is likely that the degree of goal-alignment 
will differ between and within organizations depending on their circumstances.  
Managers also make assumptions about goal-uncertainty (i.e., how much uncertainty 
exists in managers’ predictive models). Managers assess their environment and the 
measurability of organizational goals, developing predictive models (explicitly or implicitly), 
which define what the organization is aiming for, identify a plan to achieve it, and attempt to 
estimate what is likely to occur when such a plan is implemented. Since complete 
information is rarely available, managers need to take into account the uncertainty that exists 
in their models. Based on their predictive models and assumptions about people’s behaviour, 
managers make choices among alternatives of control mechanisms and decide how to act 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009).  
Middle range theories 
Based on the insights extracted from the literature (Cardinaels and Yin, 2015; Kerpershoek et 
al., 2016; Lindsay et al., 2014; McCann et al., 2015), it can be argued that the unintended 
consequences of PMSs occur in situations where managers’ ‘assumed’ reality differs from the 
‘real’ states of affairs or observed reality. How this difference comes about can again be 
explained by the limiting factors suggested by Merton (1936) (i.e., ignorance, error, 
fundamental values or ideologies, an acute focus on short-term consequences, and the 
existence of a self-fulfilling prophecy). This divergence affects the interplay between the 
chosen control mechanisms and the situation in which these mechanisms operate, decreasing 
                                                 
6 For example, taking the well-known trio of objectives in a project management perspective, that is quality, cost 
and time, the emphasis placed on each will vary considerably over the course of a project.  Such changes in 
priorities will need to be communicated to employees so that they can respond appropriately in the specific 
situations they are dealing with. 
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its fit. How and why this divergence generates dysfunctionalities is discussed below. We 
illustrate our overall conceptual framework using Figure 1.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In situations where managers assume low goal-alignment (believing that employees 
behave opportunistically) and low goal-uncertainty (in terms of the accuracy of their 
predictive model of outcomes), we expect to find greater reliance on the control mechanisms 
suggested by agency theory (i.e., directive PMSs which include specific goals, measures and 
targets, incentive pay). These control mechanisms may be appropriate in highly programmed 
and well-understood situations (although the varieties of human response may make even this 
problematic), but they may run into severe difficulties when applied to situations where the 
opposite contingencies exist. One example can be the R&D function of a large 
pharmaceutical company, where the mechanisms used for managing performance may need 
to be radically adapted to cope with managing long-term projects with highly uncertain 
outcomes and staffed by committed professionals. 
It may happen that the assumed situation reflects the premises of agency theory (i.e., 
self-serving behaviours, risk-aversion, maximisation of financial short-term goals) and the 
‘real’ organization represents the conditions of stewardship theory (i.e., shared interests and 
responsibilities, complex and long-term oriented mission and goals, many of which are non-
financial). In this extreme situation, the adoption of directive controls may significantly alter 
the organizational social ‘fabric’ and relationships. The choice of directive controls will send 
the message that people are not to be trusted, which, over time, may turn out to be true 
(Cardinaels and Yin, 2015). The increased pressure coupled with the high uncertain 
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environment and feelings of injustice may encourage employees to retaliate and exhibit the 
behaviours the system is intending to control. This situation will eventually transform the 
social dynamics (Argyris, 1953; Tan and Rae, 2009) and, as suggested by Elias (1998), the 
change in social dynamics will increase the likelihood of perverse unintended consequences.  
In situations where managers assume high goal-alignment implied from their beliefs 
of employees behaving as stewards (i.e., exerting long-term oriented, prosocial behaviours 
(Davis et al., 1997b; Hernandez, 2012)) and high goal-uncertainty; we expect to find an 
enabling PMS as suggested by stewardship theory. However, when managers’ taken for 
granted assumptions do not correspond with the observable or actual reality, social 
relationships will be altered leading to unintended undesirable consequences. For instance, in 
a university when high autonomy and collegiality (i.e., enabling controls) are applied to parts 
of the institution that have not been socialised into the academic profession and its 
internalised values and standards, the consequences of this stewardship-related controls may 
not be those intended and ‘free riding’ effects may appear.  
In situations where managers assume low (high) alignment and high (low) 
uncertainty, we expect to find hybrid PMSs. Hybrid systems will combine features of 
enabling and directive PMSs with a stronger tendency towards one or other of them 
depending on the presumed circumstances. Examples of hybrid systems can be the systems 
suggested for third sector organizations (e.g., Lindsay et al., 2014) whose leaders (and 
designers of the PMS) believe that employees and volunteers are highly aligned with the 
cause but at the same time need to produce and report financial results and predictable 
outcomes to demonstrate the value of their work to current and future donors or funders. If 
the assumed situation corresponds to the actual situation, we expect that unintended 
undesirable consequences will be minimized due to the use of a wide range of controls, which 
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will be more adapted to the needed diversity in social relationships. However, if it does not, a 
set of unintended dysfunctional consequences will emerge.  
For simplicity, we have so far assumed that reliance on directive controls and reliance 
on enabling controls are independent dimensions so that a choice to emphasize one does not 
imply a lower emphasis on the other, although there are probably constraints on the total 
amount of control used by any single organization (Franco-Santos et al., 2014). Perhaps, a 
more realistic position is to argue that how organizations choose to emphasize each of these 
two ideal types of systems is an empirical issue that cannot be theorised in detail and in 
advance, thus suggesting an important focus for future research.  
Discussion  
Performance management is an important phenomenon in organizational research and 
management practice (Otley and Soin, 2015; Smith and Bititci, 2017). Most earlier research 
has been devoted to the prediction of the intended consequences of a PMS, whilst limited 
attention has been given to the explanation of its unintended consequences (Franco-Santos et 
al., 2012). The aim of this paper is to develop a theory of the unintended undesirable 
consequences of PMSs based on a mixed review of the literature.  
Based on our mixed review of the literature, we propose that managers design and use 
PMSs based on two key assumptions. They make their choices according to their beliefs 
about goal-alignment (i.e., how aligned they believe the goals or interests of employees are to 
the interests of the organization) and about goal-uncertainty (i.e., how much uncertainty exits 
in managers’ predictive models). Based on these assumptions, managers introduce different 
combinations of the controls available to them. As Merton (1936, p. 901) asserts, 
management controls “predicated upon imaginary conditions must inevitably evoke 
unexpected consequences”. The gravity and nature of the unintended undesirable 
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consequences will depend on how and on how much managers’ assumed reality differs from 
the ‘real’ state of affairs. In sum, we argue that a false or misguided definition of the control 
situation, leads to the selection and use of a set of control mechanisms that, over time, 
generate unintended consequences transforming the existing social relationships, which can 
ultimately lead to perverse outcomes. 
We contribute to the literature on PMSs in various ways. Firstly, we question the 
validity of the common agency theory related assumptions underpinning much performance 
management research. People are not always opportunistic, the mission of an organization 
might not be to maximise its financial performance, and uncertainty is not always 
manageable through directive control mechanisms. Our typology suggests that using agency 
theory assumptions as the default position when designing and using PMSs may often be 
problematic. This has important implications for public sector entities focused on developing 
complex missions such as hospitals, schools or universities and known to be guided by 
professional values and standards. Further research could be devoted to the improvement of 
the design and use of PMSs so critical assumptions in managerial mental models are surfaced 
and questioned before key choices are made. Unintended consequences will always exist, but 
improved design and use processes may avoid them doing more harm than good. 
Secondly, the general idea behind our work connects with previous contingency 
research (Chenhall, 2003; Otley, 2016), indicating that appropriate control systems are 
unlikely to be universal. They need to be adapted to the circumstances in which they are 
being used and to the objectives being sought. PMSs are inherently complex, with different 
approaches to control being appropriate in different organizational functions, in varying 
organizational environments, and at different hierarchical levels. This assertion is in line with 
Ouchi’s (1977, 1980; 1978) ideas on the various configurations of controls according to 
context; and with more recent management control (Bedford et al., 2016; Bedford and 
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Malmi, 2015; Malmi and Brown, 2008) and operations research (Smith and Bititci, 2017) 
looking at the configuration of performance management packages. 
Thirdly, previous research has tended to concentrate on the nature of unintended 
outcomes rather than on the reasons underlying their existence. Based on our review, it is 
likely that a richer explanation could be given by considering various aspects of the context 
within which control is exercised. We would suggest that studies of how control works in 
different parts of the same organization (e.g. different geographical sites and locations, 
different business function, and different hierarchical levels) would give insights into this 
important phenomenon. Given the complexity of both PMSs and organizational contexts, it is 
suggested that studies which control for as much of this potential variation as possible (e.g. 
by using different parts of the same organization, or analysing difference within the same unit 
at different hierarchical levels) would likely give the most useful initial results. We hope that 
the framework put forward here will assist in this endeavour.  
Our work is not free from limitations. The purpose of this paper was to develop new 
theory, but it was limited by being able to examine only a fraction of the considerable amount 
of literature that exists across a range of disciplines. In our search for insights and potential 
connections, we combined a traditional review of the conceptual performance management 
literature and the sociological research on unintended consequences with a systematic review 
focused on the identification of the most salient unintended undesirable consequences of 
PMSs. This mixed review approach means that there may be parts of our work that may not 
be reproducible, which is a common situation in theory building undertakings (Weick, 1989). 
We restricted our review to research published in English using a narrow set of keywords due 
to the volume of knowledge we were attempting to review. Based on this choice, relevant 
research that may have been found using alternative concepts to the ones used (e.g., side 
effects, performance appraisals) may have been omitted. Additionally, we took the decision 
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to limit the scope of our review to research focused on overall corporate PMSs, which means 
that some unintended consequences of systems dedicated to the management of particular 
functions or processes (e.g., supply chain, marketing, new product development or 
production) have not been considered.  
Going forward, it seems evident that further PMSs research investigating the 
unintended will yield both new contributions to theory and prescriptions for practice. New 
research could take the form of qualitative studies focusing on the performance management 
practices and the unexpected consequences that can be observed to emerge in organizations 
(Ashton, 1976). Real control systems attempt to cope with both complexity and uncertainty, 
and to integrate a variety of control mechanisms. This implies that case studies of 
performance management practices that attempt to take a holistic approach (i.e. attempting to 
include all control mechanisms being used) will be an important way forward. The theory 
outlined in this paper is intended to help provide a useful encompassing framework that will 
assist such program of work, but it needs to be supplemented by empirical work that pays 
attention to the idiosyncrasies of the situations in which different organizations and their 
PMSs operate. 
Conclusion 
This research is intended to help explain how, why and when PMSs lead to unintended 
consequences some of which can be perverse. All PMSs will have both intended and 
unintended consequences. We found that directive systems are likely to produce gaming, 
information manipulation, selective attention, illusion of control, and transform social 
relationships. Most previous research has focused on the intended effects of these systems but 
both types of consequences require researching and theorising as they both vary in how 
beneficial they are for an organization. Borrowing from the sociology literature on the 
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unintended and well-known theories underpinning performance management processes 
(contingency, stewardship and agency theories) our general conclusion is that unintended 
undesirable consequences are likely to occur when a system is designed or used in 
circumstances that differ from those originally assumed. At the extreme, we suggest that the 
misrepresentation of a stewardship-type context as an agency-type context or vice-versa will 
lead to unintended undesirable consequences and this situation can make the resultant PMS 
perverse. Our main argument is that incorrect assumptions will lead to the design of ‘unfit’ 
control mechanisms, which will alter the existing social relationships influencing individual 
behaviour and ultimately lead to undesirable consequences or ‘collateral damage’ that may 
outweigh the intended outcomes. 
Given that goal-alignment and goal-uncertainty conditions are likely to differ from 
organization to organization, within different parts of a single organization, and over time, the 
outcomes associated with the use of a particular PMS are also likely to differ. Studies on the 
reasons for such difference in outcomes, rather than reports of their occurrence, are relatively 
rare. Most research to date has concentrated on improving PMSs by examining how and why 
intended consequences occur. Our work suggests that we need to pay similar attention to the 
unintended undesirable consequences of PMSs, so the risks can be reduced. At present, due 
to the complexity of most organizations, we speculate that the safest approach for 
performance management designers might be one where balance is maintained between the 
use of both directive and enabling systems. It is hoped that the framework proposed in this 
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Table 1. Literature review mixed methods overview 
 
Research method Objectives/ 
review questions 
Process 


















 The meanings of 
core terms  
 Existing shared 
research 
assumptions  





1. Selection of broad research areas: performance management systems, 
sociology research on unintended consequences 
2. Initial review of articles and books that have sought to describe the 
research on performance management systems over the years (Berry 
et al., 2009; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009; Chenhall, 2003; Ferreira 
and Otley, 2009; Franco-Santos et al., 2012; Malmi and Brown, 
2008; Otley, 1999, 2016;  Otley et al., 1995). 
3. Conduct additional searches of literature online (EBSCO, Scopus, 
google, google scholar), and university and personal libraries. 
4. Subjective selection of relevant research 
5. Qualitative synthesis addressing review objectives 



































 What is known 
about how 
and/or why they 
occur? 
1. Definition of review questions 
2. Scoping study: Argyris (1953), Ridway (1956), Smith (1995a), 
Jensen (2003), Mannion and Braithwaite (2012), and Segal and 
Lehrer (2012). 
3. Search strategy: 
- EBSCO keywords in any field (21/12/2017): (management control OR 
organi?ational control OR performance measure* OR performance 
management) AND ((unintended OR dysfunctional OR undesirable OR 
unexpected OR negative) AND (consequence* OR outcome* OR result*)); 
in peer-reviewed & academic journals; in English= 8,752papers 
- In ABS 4*&3* publications in general management, operations, 
HR, management accounting & public sector: ("Accounting, 
Organizations & Society" OR "Management Accounting Research" OR 
"Contemporary Accounting Research" OR "The Accounting Review" OR 
"Journal of Accounting Research" OR "Academy of Management Journal" 
OR "Academy of Management Review" OR "Administrative Science 
Quarterly" OR "Journal of Management" OR "British Journal of 
Management" OR "Journal of Business Research" OR "Journal of Business 
Ethics" OR "Journal of Management Studies" OR "Journal of Business 
Ethics" OR "Human Resource Management" OR "Human Resource 
Management Journal"  OR "Human Resource Management Review" OR 
"Human Relations" OR "International Journal of Human Resource 
Management" OR "Journal of Operations Management" OR "International 
Journal of Operations and Production Management" OR "International 
Journal of Production Economics" OR "Organization Science" OR 
"Management Science" OR "Public Administration Review" OR "Journal 
of Public Administration Research and Theory") = 839 papers 
4. Selection of relevant research: (a) Title and abstract reading and 
selection (based on exclusion and inclusion criteria) = 41 papers 
5. Reading of full papers and selection = 14. Additional papers found 
through cross-references and citations = 28. Total selected= 42 
6. Data extraction: Date, field of research, context, research method, 
control mechanisms investigated, unintended undesirable 
consequences for actors and others, insights that explain how and 
why unintended consequences occur. 
7. Data analysis and qualitative synthesis: Based on our review 
questions and adopting a thematic analysis, we created theme 
clusters and sub-clusters.  
 
44 








Unintended consequences Insights that explain how and why unintended 

















 Professional and 




 Movement away from previously 
held academic values 
 Resistance to external regulatory 
systems originating controls that are 
more restrictive than the systems they 
are meant to resist 
 Gaming 





 Due to commensuration reactions and self-fulfilling 
prophecy the inner working of organisations change. 
These reorientation changes, over time produce other 
changes in deeply held values, which ultimately affect 
individual behaviour. The gaming that comes with the 
reorientation processes ends up generating 
dysfunctional consequences for individuals. Symbolic 













 Grouping: employees ‘against’ 
management 
 Blame culture 
 Social relations problems (e.g., 
tensions and conflicts among 
departments and against budget 
setters) 
 Internalized pressure of line 
managers resulting in overwork, 
stress, increase monitoring of 
employees, frustration, unhappiness  
 Self-interest and silo-mentality 
 Patterns of leadership (focus on the 
numbers rather than people) 
 Illusion of control (implied) 
 
 No reference   Increase pressure leads to dysfunctions 
 Argyris mentions the use of budgets is based on the 
believe that people do not want to work unless they 










 Interpersonal tensions 
 Felt need of defensibility of 
individual action 
 Rigidity of behaviour 
 No reference  Controller’s preconceptions about the abilities and 
motivations of the people being controlled are 
reinforced by the control system. The result is mutual 
deception rather than learning. A circle develops in 
                                                 
7 Data field designated using abbreviations: Accounting (ACC), Human resources (HR), General management (GM), Public sector management (PSM), Operations (OP) 









Unintended consequences Insights that explain how and why unintended 





 Use of trappings of authority 
 Difficulty with clients 
 Bifurcation of interests 
 Conflicts among organizational sub-
units 
 Illusion of control 
 Differences between organizational 
goals and achievement 
which each’s misconception about the other is 
reinforced, potentially leading to perverse 
consequences. 
 Time is crucial for understanding overall 
consequences (i.e., beneficial short-term outcomes 
may turn to be dysfunctional over time due to 
deviation amplifying feedback). 
 Interventions can be conducted to change loops from 
dysfunctional to functional. These interventions 
operate by changing the pattern of relationships. 
Relationships, not people, are the critical control 
points in organizations. 
 
















 Gaming (storming) - Although side 
negative effects will exist, these are 
perceived to be a “price worth 
paying” for the benefits obtained in 
terms of managerial effort 
 
 
 No reference  The combination of production planning, measures, 
targets and incentives lead to motivational and 
behavioural responses from managers (ratchet 
principle) which are dysfunctional 
 High complexity and uncertainty of state enterprises 
(implied) 
 Agency theory related assumptions 













 Employee well-being (Anxiety, 
affect, stress) 
 No reference 
 













incentive pay vs. 
fixed-salary) 
 
 Employees’ dishonesty and 
misreporting  
 Distrust 
 Crowding out pro-social motivations 
 No reference  Principals with their choice of controls (incentive pay 
vs higher fixed pay) leak information to agents about 
what the principals have observed of other agents. The 
choice of fixed wage contracts implies that the 
principal believes agents have an inherent motive to 
be honest (i.e., they are not opportunistic or self-
interested). The choice of incentive contracts sends a 
message of distrust as it implies the principal assumes 
agents are likely to be opportunistic and, if not 









Unintended consequences Insights that explain how and why unintended 
consequences occur  For actors For others -
external 
stakeholders 
 Most importantly, the decision to introduce incentive 
contracts may lead an employee to believe that other 
employees in the organization are behaving 
opportunistically, which in turn can affect his/her own 
behaviour.  
 A belief suggesting that employees in general are 
opportunistic, changes social norms. Over time, 
people conform to this norm, increasing their 
opportunistic/self-interested behaviour and 
misreporting. 
 








 Measure fixation 
 Gaming 
 Dishonesty  
 Misrepresentation 
 Implied (relationship problems 
between management and 
employees) 
 No reference  The assumptions made about people in organizations 
operate as a theory which determines how employees 
will be treated. If control designers believe that 
employees have inherent mental, moral, and physical 
weaknesses so they need internal controls to achieve 
organizational goals; this assumption tends to be self-
fulfilling: Employees may retaliate by exhibiting the 
behaviour the system was intended to control. Thus, a 
perfect “control” system may stimulate violation of 
control procedures. 
 Non-compliance tends to appear in the presence of 
perceived thread (e.g., application of punitive 
measures when targets are not met, pressure for higher 















 Misrepresentation of financial 
information or ‘slack’ 
 No reference   Design issues lead to unintended undesirable 
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(1996) ACC Manufacturing 
(profit centres, 











 Data manipulation 
 Management myopia (short-termism) 
 No reference   Different cultural conditions (values & beliefs)- 
Japanese under equally tight controls (although not 
the same controls) respond with less dysfunctional 
consequences. 
















 Selective attention (visibility of what 
can be measured, invisibility of what 
cannot be measured) 
 Restricting political change 
(numbers, not people, as responsible 
for decisions) 





 The performance management system (PPB) 
introduced a new discourse that equated truth focused 
on the things that could be counted. Less tangible 
aspects became invisible. Over time, this 
‘instrumental rationality’ dismissed as irrational 
decision making based on intuition and morality. 
Meanings were lost and the focused moved from 
human actors to structural and technical defence 
issues. This process led to the belief that “every 
problem could be managed” which affected leadership 
perceptions and behaviours.  
Conrad & 
Guven Uslu  
(2012) ACC Public sector 
(NHS hospital, 













quality of care 
 Adoption of private-sector like practices in a context 
where these practices do not apply (different 
rationalities) 
 Lack of control of factors affecting performance 










 Disrupted production 
 Administrative overload and 
managerial time costs 
 Damaging social relationships 
 No reference  Increase pressure leads to dysfunctions 

















 Gaming (metrics “pushing” people in 
the wrong direction) 
 Data manipulation 
 Double injustice (ethical dilemmas & 
then unfair rewards) 







 Increase pressure leads to dysfunctions 










Unintended consequences Insights that explain how and why unintended 
consequences occur  For actors For others -
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stakeholders 
  Mission/Strategy drift (revisions 
based on what can be counted rather 
than what is relevant) 
 Measure fixation (people focused on 
the measured and ignored what was 
not measured) 
















incentive pay and 
profit-sharing) 
 
 Dishonesty  No reference   Agency theory assumes that people have a low 
threshold for dishonesty; they will lie for little 
payoffs. However, this research shows that people are 
considerably honest 
 The degree of dishonesty or misrepresentation of 
financial information is dependent on the type of 
contract used: less sharing of wealth between 
organization and employees; more dishonesty. Fixed 
salary and profit-sharing prompt more honest 
reporting. Performance related pay leads to more 
dishonesty. 
 People care about more things that just wealth; they 






































society at large 
(not measured)  
 Wrong assumptions about academics’ motivations and 
the context of academia leading to directive controls 
which affect well-being and, over time, would have 
negative effects on motivation, behaviours and social 
relationships leading to further unintended 
consequences not just for academics but also for 
others. 
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 Dishonesty   No reference   The research assumes managers (agents) are 
opportunistic (misaligned goals). They may 
misrepresent private information in order to maximize 
their own self-interest.  
 Using a measurement/information system influences 
the ability of an agent to appear honest. It gives the 
principal a signal about the agent’s private 
information. By comparing this signal to the 
managers’ report, the principal can form an 
impression of the agent’s honesty. 
 Misrepresentation of financial information depends on 
the design choices of the measurement/information 
system 
 The use of an information system (vs the no use) 
enhances honesty. A precise system is associated to a 
higher level of honesty than a coarse system.  
 An assumption in this research is that the agent cannot 




























 Building on the behavioural theory of the firm, it is 
argued that misrepresentation is caused by the use of 
strong incentive compensation and poor financial 
performance compared to expectations. This argument 















 Time costs 
 Constrain responsiveness and are 
often a barrier to change 
 Strengthen vertical command-and-
control 
 Miss out on emerging network 
structures 
 Encourage gaming and perverse 
behaviours 
 Reinforce department barriers rather 
than encourage knowledge sharing 
 Make people feel undervalued 
 No reference   Design issues. Better designs that improve the 
budgeting process (activity-based budgeting 
approach) or abandon it (beyond budgeting) reduce 
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 Gaming (earnings management –e.g., 
“taking a bath”) 
 
 No reference  
 
 Bonus plans incentivize managers to select accounting 
techniques that enhance the value of their bonus 
payments. It is implied that this relationship occurs 
because managers are self-interested; the use of bonus 
plans that use accounting measures does not limit their 
opportunisms, it actually enhances it as they can 
manipulate these measures.   
 













 Gaming or strategic behaviour 
(ratchet effect, threshold effect, 
output distortion 
 Manipulation of data (cheating) 
 Bulling and blame culture 
 Eagerness of central managers to 
accept “good news”  
 Implied illusion of control 
 
 Decreased 





 Not explicitly stated explanation. However, at the end 
of the article, it is mentioned that most of the 
measures taken to decrease gaming were based on a 
low-trust approach that aimed to improve the design 
of the measurement system (tighter definitions, targets 
refinement, audit investigations, penalties, etc.). These 
practices reinforced   
Hopwood (1972) ACC For profit sector 
(Manufacturing 
Departments, 






 Job related tensions 
 Less favourable relationships with 
peers, distrust and rivalry, lack of 
cooperation 
 Short-term orientation 
 Data manipulation 




  Different approaches to the use of directive 
mechanisms (budget constrained style, profit 
conscious) 
 Problems with the design of accounting measures 
(incompleteness, high complexity - lack of precision 
knowledge of the organization’s economic cost 
function, sole focus on outcomes, focus on short-term 
financial performance, the cost of providing relevant 
data, multiple purposes) 
 Hopwood argues that “accounting data do not in of 
themselves pose a threat to members of an 
organization” (p.174). The severity of unintended 
consequences depends on the way in which the data is 
used by managers (with the Budget constraints style 
creating serious concerns).  
 The budget constraints style assumes the need to 









Unintended consequences Insights that explain how and why unintended 
consequences occur  For actors For others -
external 
stakeholders 
rather than interpreting the evaluation process as an 
ongoing activity of organizational learning. It 
becomes the primary source of control and motivation 
becoming a constraint rather than a problem-solving 
mechanism. It imposes a “false measure of cognitive 
simplicity onto a complex and highly interdependent 
series of activities” (p. 175).  
 













 Lying (misrepresentation) 
 Gaming (e.g., sale products to entities 
that had not ordered them, move 
revenues from one quarter to the 
previous quarter by backdating sales 
agreements, entered into secret side 
agreements with clients, etc.) 
 Destroy value for organizations 
 Illusion of control 
 No reference  Relating pay and promotions to performance targets 
leads to gaming and lying, which is disastrous for 
organizations 
 Budget systems assume that managers should be 
rewarded for meeting targets and punish if they don’t. 
Because of this, managers will have incentives to set 
easy targets, and do whatever it takes to meet them 
(even if their actions destroy value for the company).  
 Gaming is inevitable, it is part of business life.  
 Jensen assumes that managers are self-interested. 
Once a budget-target reward system is in operation, 
managers have no interest in providing accurate 
information in their budgets. This leads to critical 
information being hidden and chaotic actions leading 
to dysfunctionalities. Honesty and integrity are 
eroded. “Managing the numbers” is considered a part 
of management and these gaming behaviours become 
undiscussable. 
     
















 Data manipulation (prudent and 
reckless) 
 Differences between measured 
performance and actual performance 
 
 Decreased 





 The dysfunctionalities of unintended consequences 
can be observable and theoretically predicted.  
 Initially, the study draws on agency theory ideas to 
explain misrepresentation, suggesting that 
misrepresentation occurs due to information 
asymmetry and self-interested assumptions. However, 
the results suggest that this model does not operate in 
the Russian public-sector context. 
 The Russian public-sector context is characterized by: 
negativity bias, blame avoidance and attention 
aversion. The behaviour of individuals working in this 
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consequences occur  For actors For others -
external 
stakeholders 
man’ model rather than the agency theory’s 
‘economic man’ model.  
 Prudent misrepresentation emerged in intelligent 
regimes (measurement system without targets and 
rankings). This type of behaviour was driven by 
individuals’ need for security and convenience (i.e., to 
minimize attention). Prudent manipulated data are 
inconspicuous to supervising authorities. If no audit is 
done, the validity of the data for decision making is 
undermined. However, it may be that the ultimate 
purpose of the Russian government is to have a 
‘meaningless system’ overloaded with data. This 
system will reflect Foucault’s (1977) ‘bureaucratic 
panopticon’, creating a normalizing effect. The 
importance is not the quality of data, but the 
conformity and power that the system provides. 
 Reckless manipulation was driven by the pressure 
generated by the use of systems including measures, 




de Bruijn  
(Kerpershoe
k et al., 
2016) 















 Misrepresentation of data (or ‘up-
coding’) leading to misrepresentation 
and suboptimal allocation of 
resources 
 Strategic selection of expedient cases 




 The justification for a new performance management 
system was driven by an agency theory rationale. 
However, the agency theory explanation of 
unintended consequences (self-interest, opportunism) 
is incomplete. Consideration of both financial and 
professional motives is required to understand the 
complex nature of this phenomenon. 
 Unintended consequences are related to design issues 
(the link of measures to rewards and sanctions; a high 
financial impact) and the level of professionalism 
(specialized knowledge and competences). 
 Medical professionals assumed to be intrinsically 
driven by professional or value-based motivations 
(i.e., stewards rather than agents). Their motivation is 
based on “making a contribution to their patients and 
society”.  
 Managerial rationale in conflict with the professional 
rationale: (1) performance management systems are 









Unintended consequences Insights that explain how and why unintended 
consequences occur  For actors For others -
external 
stakeholders 
dynamic nature of professional environments; (2) 
these systems are driven by management objectives 
(transparency, efficiency, costs), while professional 
processes are driven by shared standards, cognitive 
beliefs and autonomy. Performance management is 
perceived to undermine intrinsic motivation, 
especially when incentive pay is used and undermines 
professional autonomy.  
 Unintended consequences generate opportunistic 
behaviour, but these may not be perverse (i.e., to 
satisfy their own interests). This behaviour may be to 
benefit patients or institutions 
 Based on the professionalism and cognitive evaluation 
theory, unintended consequences can be explained 
due to the underlying values that drive medical 
professionals (competence and autonomy) 
 A third explanation is that the performance 
management system inevitably lags behind the 



















 Neglect of the importance of the 
relationship between administrators 
and politicians  
 Time costs 
 Risk of corruption and personal 
advantages 
 Decreased employee morale 
 
 No reference  The complex reality of political decision making 
 A “false theory” about the importance of relationships 
and their interwoven nature 














rewards (implicit in 
text) 
 
Strategic behavioural responses 
 Gaming 
 Misrepresentation of data by local 
officials,  
 Manipulation of data reported to 
upper-level government officials 
 Measure fixation 
 
 Decreased 
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 Mission drift  
 Stifled innovation 
 Measure fixation 
 Increasing ‘contractualism’ (less 
relational and more standardized  
less flexibility) 
 Gaming 
 Barriers to co-production of public 
services 
 Short-termism crowding out long-
term focus 
 
 No reference   Reasons for unintended consequences associated to 
the underlying assumptions of New Public 
Management (i.e., agency theory) coupled with the 
complexity of governing public services. 
 It suggests that for third sector organizations a better 
approach would be a relational model of working 
based on trust, open information, practice-sharing and 
participation of stakeholders based on their expertise, 
rather than contractual models, targets and other 
market related mechanisms.  
Lowe & 
Shaw 











 Gaming (slack) 
 Misrepresentation of financial 
information 
 Decision making dysfunctionalities 
 No reference   Design issues (links to pay). People’s sense of gain (or 
loss) associated with measured performance and 
reflected in the various rewards they may or may not 
receive may explain slack. 
 Influence of company practices and norms 
 Managers’ insecurity 
Maas & Van 
Rinsum 






incentive pay and 
profit-sharing), 
performance reporting  
 
 Dishonesty - Misreporting   No reference   Affected by the design of the control system 
















 Poor measurement (measurement 
fixation, tunnel vision, myopia, 
ossification, anachronism, 
quantification privileging) 
 Misplaced incentives and sanctions 
(complacency, silo-creation, 
overcompensation, under-
compensation, insensitivity and 
increased inequality) 
 Breach of trust (misrepresentation, 
gaming, misinterpretation, bullying, 
 Decreased 





 Unintended undesirable consequences cannot be 
entirely mitigated. They can be minimized if design 
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erosion of trust and reduced staff 
morale) 
 Politicisation of performance systems 














measures and targets 
 Targets culture 
 Workforce morale and dysfunctional 
employee relations 
 Selective prioritization 
 Gaming 
 Ignoring 




 Conflicting logics of efficiency and integrity of care 
generate tensions on an everyday basis. The 
inclination of staff is to prioritise integrity of care but 
this can be problematic due to the pressures of 
accountability. Staff responds to the tensions as 
“street-level bureaucrats” looking for the best 
outcome for patients, which can lead to unintended 
consequences (from the point of view of the 
performance management system, but not from the 
point of view of patients) 
 Over time, tensions may lead to a dysfunctional work 
culture focused on ‘making the numbers’ affecting 
intrinsic motivations and morale.  
 






measures and targets 
(budgets) 
 Manipulation  
 Myopia (short-term orientation) 
 Gaming 
 Discouragement of new ideas 
 Improvements in the short-term 
financial results while harming the 
company’s long-term interests 
 
 No reference  Increase pressure to meet targets leads to dysfunctions 
 Managers operating in relatively uncertain 
environments were significantly more likely to react 
to budget pressure by gaming the system 
Murphy (2004) GM For profit – 
various 
industries (Sales, 





“Problematic behaviours” due to short-
term targets 
 Gaming (extra purchases, 
overemphasis on target products, 
increased credit risks) 
 Neglect of work aspects that are not 
related to short-term targets 
 Reduce helping and sharing 
information 






for society due 
to unethical 
behaviours 
 Increase pressure leads to dysfunctions 
 They are less likely to occur in organizations with 
safeguards in place (e.g., corporate reputation, codes, 
reinforcing mechanisms encouraging ethical 
behaviour) and high commitment/trust environments 
 Some people are more (or less) prone to problematic 
behaviours (people with high-status aspiration and 
competitiveness may require more controls; highly 
educated people, people with high affective 
commitment, and those with close relationships to 
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Otley (1978) ACC For profit 
(Manufacturing 
subunits, UK) 








 No reference  Distortion of information can occur even when the 
system is technically adequate. 
 The way in which accounting information is used is 
conditioned partly on managers’ managerial 
philosophy (key shared assumptions) and it may vary 
from unit to unit according to the toughness of its 
operating environment and its size and profitability.  
 The way in which the system is used by different 
manager has a marked effect on the accuracy 
of budget estimates. 
 There was collusion between mangers to provide 
biased information to higher levels, but to manage 













 Dishonesty (misrepresentation of 
financial information – depending on 
the design of control system) 
 
 No reference   Explanations based on agency theory assumptions: “in 
the absence of truth-inducing contracts, subordinates 
will misrepresent their private information to serve 
their own interests, regardless of the effect on the 
firm”; however, their level of dishonesty depends on 
budget design decisions. 
 One of these decisions refers to authority over 
budgets. When subordinates have final authority over 
budgets their concerns for fairness and honesty are 
higher, when superiors have final authority there is no 
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 Measure fixation 
 Work distortion (gaming) 
 Neglect of work aspects that can’t be 
measured 
 “Storming” at the end of target period 
 Distrust (both on data due to 
misrepresentation and on people) 
 Blaming  
 Wasted effort 
 Rejection of complexity that may 
affect planned measured results 
 Reduced morale 
 Ratchet effect 
 Adverse influence on overall goal 
accomplishment of the organization 
 
No reference  Motivational and behavioural aspects affected by the 
use of performance measures 
Salterio & 
Webb 













 Lying/ dishonesty (misrepresentation 
of information) 












 Gaming (Slack) 
 
 No reference  Managers satisfaction of personal interests  
Schwepker 
& Good  







measures and targets 
(focus on perceived 
difficulty of target 
achievement) 
** The research does 
not pay attention to 
planning, review or 
 Decreased trust in the organization 
 Decreased customer-oriented selling 
 Decreased effectiveness of sales-
oriented behaviour 
 
 No reference   Design issues (increased target difficulty leads to 
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reward mechanisms but 



























 Minor corruption 
Directive: 





 No reference 
 
 Assumptions about people’s behaviour (self-fulfilling 
prophecy) 
 Increased pressure to perform 
 Organizational complexity 















 Tunnel vision 
 Sub-optimization 
 Myopia 












 Lack of congruence between organizational objectives 
and measurement system 
 Inability to measure complex phenomena with 
precision and accuracy 
 Inability to respond to changing circumstances 














 Commodifying services 
 De-professionalization of public 
sector workers 
 Social relationships transformation 
(emphasis on measured aspects) 
 Values become less important than 
measures 






 Increased pressure 





Table 3. Summary of literature review insights 
 
ECLECTIC  SYSTEMATIC 
Literature 
Performance management systems 
 
Definition 
Set of control mechanisms (planning, 
measurement, targets, review, performance 
related rewards) used to facilitate the 
delivery of organizational goals by 




 Interrelated controls 
 In constant evolution 
 Formal and informal 
 Based on predictive mental models 
 
Theories 
 Contingency theory of accounting 
(Otley, 1980, 2016)  
- ‘Universal approach’ to the design 
and use of controls unlikely to be 
effective.  
- Controls are to be tailored to fit the 
organization’s specific circumstances 
to provide their intended results.  
 Agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
- Assumptions: agents (employees) = 
‘Economic man’ (self-serving or 
opportunistic, effort-averse, risk-
averse, extrinsic drive/motivation); 
the ultimate objective is 
organizational goals maximization 
- Problems that need addressing: 
interests/goals alignment; uncertainty 
(information asymmetry) 
- Proposed solution - adoption of 
‘directive’ control mechanisms: 
monitoring (explicit goals, measures, 
targets, evaluation) and incentives 
 Stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997b; 
Hernandez, 2012) 
- Assumptions: stewards (employees) = 
shared responsibilities and long-term 
goals, intrinsic motivation 
- Problems that need addressing: 
uncertainty (environmental) and 
maintenance of alignment (associated 
to intrinsic drives/motivation) 
- Proposed solution – adoption of 
‘enabling’ mechanisms: fostering 
high-trust environments through share 
leadership, collective responsibility, 







Effects of purposive action 
which are different from those 




 There is an intention from 
the point of view of the 
designer of a performance 
management system 
 Unintended consequences 
(desirable and undesirable) 
are inevitable.  
 Undesirable consequences 
can turn to be perverse 
(more harm than good) 
 Undesirable consequences 
can be minimized, never 
eliminated 
 It is important to theorize 




 Merton (1936) explains 
unintended consequences as 
resulting from the interplay 
of action and situation. The 
lack of anticipation might be 
due five limiting factors: 
lack of knowledge, error, 
acute concern for short-term 
results, values (or ideology), 
self-fulfilling prophecy. 
These factors are not 
mutually exclusive (they can 
reinforce each other). 
 Elias (1997, 1998) explains 
unintended consequences 
Literature 




 Organisations relying on 
directive performance 
management systems (i.e., 
agency theory related) in 
highly uncertain contexts 
are likely to experience 
more undesirable 
unintended consequences 
not just for the actors but 
also for their stakeholders 
 





 Gaming (81% of selected 
literature) 
 Information manipulation 
(74%) 
 Selective attention (55%) 
 Illusion of control (24%) 
 Alter social relationships 
(81%) 
Other: 
 Administrative overload 




decreased well-being and 
morale (10%); stifled 
innovation (5%); 
unfairness and inequality 
(5%). 
 




 High pressure 
 Design and use issues 
 Complexity and 
uncertainty 
 Underlying assumptions 
(false assumptions about 
people, importance of 





Figure 1. Conceptual framework of the unintended consequences of performance 
management systems (PMS) 
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